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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-2972 
___________ 
 
MARZENA MAGDALENA BERA, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                    Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A089-913-017) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Frederic G. Leeds 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 6, 2014 
Before:  FISHER, VANASKIE and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: February 12, 2014 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Marzena Magdalena Bera (“Bera”) petitions for review of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ (the “Board”) final order of removal.  For the reasons that follow, 
we will deny the petition for review. 
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I. 
Petitioner Marzena Magdalena Bera, a citizen of Poland, entered the United States 
in September 2007.  In September 2008, she applied for asylum but was referred to 
removal proceedings.  The notice to appear charged her with being present in violation of 
the law, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B).  She conceded removability and applied 
for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 
(“CAT”).  In support of her application, she claimed that she had been persecuted in 
Poland because she participated in the Solidarity Movement during the 1980s and 
because she is Jewish. 
In an oral decision, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) determined that Bera was 
credible, but he concluded that the harassment and discrimination that she faced did not 
amount to past persecution.  The IJ found that Bera had not established that she would 
face future persecution if she returned to Poland, especially in light of the evidence 
contained in the International Religious Freedom Report, which indicated that the Polish 
government was reaching out to the Jewish community to improve the quality of life.  
The IJ also determined that the Polish government was “ready, willing and able” to offer 
protection to Bera.  On that basis, the IJ denied Bera’s asylum, withholding of removal, 
and CAT claims and ordered her removal to Poland.   
Bera appealed to the Board, and then filed three motions to remand.  In June 2013, 
the Board dismissed her appeal, after determining that Bera had not established that she 
suffered past persecution or that she had a well-founded fear of future persecution.  The 
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Board then agreed with the IJ’s conclusion that Bera had not established a clear 
probability of future persecution that would make her eligible for withholding of 
removal.  Regarding her CAT claim, the Board found that Bera had not established that it 
was “‘more likely than not’ that she would be subject to torture by, or with the consent or 
acquiescence of[,] a public official or other person acting in official capacity in Poland.”  
The Board lastly considered the additional evidence that Bera submitted alongside her 
motions to remand, and it determined that the evidence did not establish Bera’s prima 
facie eligibility for relief.
1
  Bera, through counsel, filed a timely petition for review. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  While our review extends only to the 
Board’s order of removal, we may review the decision of the IJ to the extent that the 
Board’s order expressly adopts or defers to a finding of the IJ.  Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 
F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 2003).  “We apply substantial evidence review to agency findings 
of fact, departing from factual findings only where a reasonable adjudicator would be 
compelled to arrive at a contrary conclusion.”  Mendez-Reyes v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 
428 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2005).  Our review of legal conclusions is de novo, subject to 
principles of deference.  Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2010).  We 
                                              
1
 The Board also determined that Bera had not shown any prejudice arising from 
interruptions during and mistranslations of her testimony, and that Bera failed to appeal 
the IJ’s determination that she was ineligible for asylum based on domestic violence.  We 
note that, because Bera failed to raise these issues in her petition for review and opening 
brief, they are waived.  See Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 609 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005).     
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review denials of motions to remand under a deferential abuse of discretion standard.  
See Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2010).   
III. 
The Board denied Bera’s asylum claim after concluding that Bera had failed to 
establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution.  To establish past 
persecution, an alien must show that, on account of a statutorily protected ground, she 
suffered “threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that 
they constitute a real threat to life or freedom .”  Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 
518 (3d Cir. 2006).  Isolated incidents that do not result in serious injury are generally not 
considered examples of persecution.  See Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 615 (3d Cir. 
2005).  Moreover, where an alien complains of threats, she must demonstrate that the 
threats are “highly imminent and menacing in nature,” so much so that they “cause 
significant actual ‘suffering or harm.’”  Chavarria, 446 F.3d at 518.   
At the merits hearing before the IJ, Bera testified that, as a result of her 
involvement with the Solidarity Movement, she was detained for a period of three days in 
1982 and was legally unable to work or receive public assistance for the next eight years.  
Bera also testified to a number of anti-Semitic incidents leading up to and following her 
2006 conversion to Judaism.  Her husband, in-laws, and children responded with verbal 
abuse and disapproval.  Soon after Bera’s conversion, she was terminated from her 
municipal teaching job, though she did receive a pension within several months.  At 
various times prior to her arrival in the United States, she was harassed by strangers, 
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including incidents where “skinheads” confronted her on the street, unknown people 
imprinted nearly 50 Stars of David on the sidewalk in front of her home, counter-
protesters threw tomatoes and garbage at her during a Parade for Equality, and passengers 
twice yelled at her while she read the Talmud and a Hebrew prayer book on the train.  
She also had a difficult time finding an apartment after divorcing her husband.  At some 
point, Leszek Bubel, a well-known leader of the anti-Semitic Polish National Party, 
published Bera’s name in a book called the Great Encyclopedia of Jews.  After she left 
Poland, she sublet her apartment to two Jewish friends who were later evicted, and Bera’s 
possessions, including Judaica, were then destroyed by the landlord.  However, Bera 
reported none of these incidents to the police or other authorities. 
Bera’s past experiences are troublesome but they fall short of past persecution.  
When she was arrested for three days in the 1980s, she was not mistreated or otherwise 
harmed.  See Kibinda v. Att’y Gen., 477 F.3d 113, 119-20 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that a 
five-day detention and beating that required stitches and left a scar were not “severe 
enough to constitute persecution under our stringent standard”).  The incidents of anti-
Semitism that Bera experienced were isolated and she did not report any serious injuries.  
See Voci, 409 F.3d at 615.  She has not shown that the inclusion of her name in the Great 
Encyclopedia of Jews was a highly imminent threat causing her “significant actual 
suffering or harm,” such that it constitutes persecution.  See Chavarria, 446 F.3d at 518.  
Although she reported two distinct periods of economic suffering — after she was 
arrested in 1982 and again after she was terminated from her teaching job in 2006 — she 
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also testified that she was able to work illegally and obtain a secondary degree during the 
1980s, and that she received a pension in 2006.  She has therefore not shown that she 
suffered from economic persecution.  See Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 169 (3d Cir. 
2005) (holding that the “deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage” that 
could threaten a petitioner’s life or freedom may constitute persecution).  We therefore 
conclude that substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Bera failed to 
demonstrate past persecution. 
The record evidence also supports the Board’s conclusion that Bera failed to 
demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution.  To prevail, Bera needed to show 
“potential harm rising to the level of persecution on account of a statutorily enumerated 
ground that is committed by the government or by forces the government is unable or 
unwilling to control.”  Kibinda, 477 F.3d at 119.  The record shows that anti-Semitic 
threats are made somewhat frequently in Poland.  Moreover, Bera’s name is included in 
Leszek Bubel’s anti-Semitic publication.  However, Bera did not establish the 
involvement of any governmental officials in publishing the Great Encyclopedia of Jews, 
nor did she show that the threats to Poland’s Jewish population are made by the 
government or forces the Polish government is unable or unwilling to control.  
Substantial evidence therefore supports the Board’s determination that Bera did not have 
an objective basis for her fear of future prosecution.
2
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 Bera fares no better on her withholding of removal claim, as the showing required for 
withholding of removal is the “heightened” showing of a clear probability of future 
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The Board denied Bera’s CAT claim after concluding that Bera had not 
established that it was more likely than not that she would be subject to torture upon her 
return to Poland.  To be eligible for CAT relief, an alien must show that it is more likely 
than not that she will be tortured if removed to the country in question.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.16(c)(2).  “Torture” consists of the intentional infliction of “severe pain or 
suffering . . . by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity.”  8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).  Bera 
did not show that it is more likely than not that having her name published in the Great 
Encyclopedia of Jews makes her a target for torture by, or with the consent or 
acquiescence of, a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 
Finally, the Board denied Bera’s motions to remand after determining that Bera’s 
newly submitted evidence would not establish her prima facie eligibility for relief.  The 
Board treats motions to remand in the same manner as motions to reopen the record.  
Huang, 620 F.3d at 389-90.  Accordingly, the Board may deny the motion where the 
alien has not established a prima facie case for the relief sought.  Caushi v. Att’y Gen., 
436 F.3d 220, 231 (3d Cir. 2006).  Here, Bera submitted new evidence showing that the 
Polish government thwarted a potential bomb attack on parliament, which had been 
planned by an avowed anti-Semite.  She also submitted evidence of verbal attacks on 
                                                                                                                                                  
persecution.  Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 426 (3d Cir. 2011).  Bera also did not 
establish her eligibility for humanitarian asylum, which is reserved for those who have 
suffered severe past persecution.  See Sheriff v. Att’y Gen., 587 F.3d 584, 594-95 (3d 
Cir. 2009).   
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Jews at a restaurant, in a play, and online (including music videos made by Leszek 
Bubel).  The Board plausibly concluded that Bera’s evidence demonstrated the presence 
of potential societal discrimination, but not persecution.  We therefore conclude that the 
agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Bera’s motions to remand.  See Huang, 
620 F.3d at 379, 390. 
After reviewing the record, we cannot conclude that the Board’s decision was not 
supported by substantial evidence.  Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. 
